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This paper analyzes the portfolio structure of households in the Netherlands. It consid-
ers the allocation of financial wealth to two major asset categories, namely saving accounts
on the one hand and stocks and bonds on the other hand. The latter category is considered
to be more risky than the former. We analyze the impact of the overall level of wealth,
the marginal tax rate, and other variables on the allocation between assets, using cross–
section data drawn in 1988 that provide detailed information on the structure of household
wealth, not only on ownership but also on the amounts of wealth held in the respective asset
categories. The econometric specification is a trivariate tobit type model. One equation
explains the total level of wealth, a second one explains individual threshold values below
which no wealth is held. The third equation explains the share of wealth invested in stocks
and bonds. The model is estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood. Limited
information provided by the data (non–reporting) is explicitly taken into account. Results
show that wealth and the marginal tax rate are major determinants of the allocation between
safe and risky assets.
Keywords: household saving, portfolio choice, limited dependent variables
JEL classification: C34, D12, G11
∗correspondence address of the authors:
CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands; e–mail:
S.Hochguertel@kub.nl, Rob.Alessie@kub.nl, A.H.O.vanSoest@kub.nl
†We are grateful to Research International Nederland (RIN) for providing the data, and to an anonymous referee
for helpful suggestions. All remaining errors are ours. The first author is supported by the VSB savings project,
research of the third author is made possible by a fellowship of the Netherlands Royal Academy of Arts and
Sciences (KNAW). A previous version of this paper has appeared under the same title as VSB–CentER Savings
Project Progress Report, No. 23, Tilburg University.
1
I. Introduction
This paper deals with the structure of household portfolios in financial wealth in the Netherlands.
The question of how people allocate their portfolios has attracted considerable interest in the past,
from a theoretical, empirical and economic policy point of view. One of the central questions is
whether the portfolio structure has an impact on the overall savings rate and whether the govern-
ment can influence national saving — which is a major determinant of growth and the capability
of the economy to invest — by means of differential tax treatment (see the discussion on tax–
deferred saving incentives in e.g. Venti and Wise (1986) or, more recently, Engen et al. (1994)).
Moreover, the portfolio allocation determines the risk the economy is willing to bear, which can
have substantial impacts on welfare, and can itself be influenced by policy instruments. For in-
stance, policies related to the distribution of wealth can have an impact on portfolio composition.
The motivation for most of the empirical literature on household portfolio choice, stems from a
discrepancy between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. For the analysis of portfolio
choice, the standard model in financial economics is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
It implies that investors only care about mean and variance of their assets. In equilibrium they
will hold only the minimum–variance portfolio (if a riskless asset is available this will be the
only asset in that portfolio) and the market portfolio (which is a value–weighted mutual fund
of all securities available in the market) independently of their tastes and endowments. The
only difference between individuals is the proportions invested in the two portfolios. According
to their individual risk tolerance, they either hold a combination of the riskless asset and the
market portfolio or they leverage their portfolio by holding a short position in the riskless asset
by borrowing (see the recent, non–technical overview in Sharpe (1991)).
In the empirical literature however, evidence is found that individuals hold portfolios of
very diverse nature, usually containing only a small number of different assets. To explain this
considerable lack of diversification per individual, fixed transaction costs in the form of holding
or monitoring costs have been considered (cf. Goldsmith (1976) and Mayshar (1981)). The idea
behind this is that the net return on assets depends on the amount held in the asset. Furthermore,
institutional restrictions such as minimum purchase requirements that act as rationing schemes
or constraints on short sales induce consumers not to hold particular assets (cf. Deaton (1981)
for the impact of rationing on demand). Yet another approach deals with explaining why the
portfolio structure is biased towards or against certain assets without necessarily leading to zero
holdings. This includes the analysis of taxes and differential tax treatments which alter the
relative price of assets (Feldstein (1976)) or capital market imperfections such as borrowing or
liquidity constraints (Paxson (1990)) or incomplete information (King and Leape (1987)).
The empirical literature on household portfolio choice based on survey data commences with
a study by Uhler and Cragg (1971) who use a multinomial logit model to explain the level of
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diversification. They analyze the effect of wealth and disposable income, as well as age and
family size, on the choice of the level of diversification. The idea is that fixed transaction costs
become less important as the total volume of resources increases. Alessie et al. (1993a) center on
the endogeneity of marginal tax rates in the choice of the portfolio, which arises from different
tax rates for different assets. Thus, the level of marginal tax rates induces further diversification
which in turn affects taxable capital income. Taxable income is thus treated as an endogenous
variable in the problem of the number of assets chosen. King and Leape (1987) and Ioannides
(1992) focus on the number of asset categories in a household asset portfolio as well.
Feldstein (1976) estimates shares equations for different assets, stressing the importance of
taxes in the problem of portfolio choice, but neglects all zero wealth observations. Similar in
method, but different in emphasis is the paper by Hubbard (1985), who analyzes the influence of
holding social security wealth and private pension wealth on asset demand, conditional on these
assets being held at all. King and Leape (1984) stress that the portfolio choice problem involves
both a decision which assets to hold and how to allocated resources between assets; these two
decisions are inseparable. They investigate the diversification problem by estimating a switching
regression model with endogenous switching. The choice problem consists of a discrete choice
of which assets to choose, and an asset demand function conditional on ownership. Agell and
Edin (1990) combine features of the King and Leape and Feldstein papers by specifying asset
demand functions, conditional on ownership, as a function of household characteristics, where a
dummy indicates the chosen portfolio; since these dummies are considered endogenous, they are
replaced with predicted probabilities from separate, reduced form probits per asset ownership
combination. In each conditional asset demand equation — they are all estimated separately
— features a Heckman correction term from univariate probits of asset ownership to correct
for sample selection bias. The marginal tax rate as right–hand–side variable is instrumented to
allow for endogeneity. Guiso et al. (1994) set up a single equation two–limit tobit model for
the share of various risky assets. Their major concern is the impact of borrowing constraints
and uninsurable income risk on the portfolio structure. Additional empirical investigations have
been conducted by Shorrocks (1982), King and Dicks–Mireaux (1982) and Ioannides (1992).
Amemiya et al. (1993) compare three tobit estimators for demand equations of two assets.
The first arises from a maximizing quadratic utility in assets under non–negativity constraints.
The second explicitly models the impact of transaction costs on the level of diversification
and explains conditional on that, individual asset demands. The third estimator models the
investment decision as a sequential choice where demands for two assets are generated from the
residual wealth after the demand for a first asset has been subtracted.
From the economic modelling point of view, most related to the idea of the present paper
is probably Venti and Wise (1986). These authors estimate demand equations derived from an
objective function with branch structure. They distinguish between income allocation between
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consumption and savings on one level, and between assets on the other level.
The present paper wants to shed some light on the portfolio structure of households in the
Netherlands. We consider the allocation of wealth between two major asset categories, namely
saving accounts on the one hand, and stocks and bonds on the other hand. The latter category is
considered to be more risky than the former. We use a data set that provides detailed information
on the structure of household wealth, not only on ownership, but also on the amounts of wealth
held in the respective asset categories. We consider a three equation model. The first equation
is a censored regression equation in which total wealth invested in savings or stocks and bonds
(to be referred to as wealth in the sequel) is explained from family income and other background
variables. By means of a second equation we take into account the possibility of individual
differences in a lower bound for demand for either one of the two assets. The third equation
is a two–limit tobit equation in which the share of total wealth invested in stocks and bonds is
explained from the level of wealth and from family characteristics. We allow for endogeneity
of wealth in the share equation and for selection bias due to zero wealth or unobserved asset
amounts. The latter is possible since the routing of the questions allows us to infer that the
amount is positive whenever no amount is given but the ownership question has been answered
in the affirmative.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a short economic motivation for
the econometric model, whose structure is outlined in the succeeding section. An overview of
the data that have been analyzed is given in section IV. Results are discussed and evaluated in
section V. The concluding section shortly discusses possible extensions of the model into several
directions.
II. Economic Motivation
To motivate the empirical analysis in this paper, we formulate a simple one–period model for
each household. At the beginning of the period, the household can choose how to allocate the
available amount Y , consisting of, say, assets available from the previous period and current
income. It can allocate Y in various ways: consumption, durables, housing, illiquid assets, and
financial assets.1 We are interested in two types of financial assets, one riskfree and one risky.
Let qA denote the vector of amounts allocated to these two assets, and let qB denote the vector
of amounts allocated in other ways. Because of consumption and because of the (distribution
of the) value of the assets at the end of the time period, each allocation has some (expected)
utility level U(qA, qB). We assume that the household maximizes utility subject to the budget
allocation constraint:
maxqA,qB U(qA, qB)




Here, ι is a vector of ones of appropriate dimension. For the general utility function given above,
the optimal quantities of interest qA will be a complicated function of all variables determining
utility of qA and qB, i.e., for example, prices of consumption and housing. We want to focus on
the allocation of financial wealth between different types of assets. The natural way to achieve
this is to impose restrictions on the preference structure, i.e. to assume direct weak separability:
U(qA, qB) = U(UA(qA), qB)
Here UA(qA) could, for example, be given by
UA(qA) = E[u(R
′qA)]
where R is the two–dimensional random vector of pay–offs of the two financial assets, and
where u is some utility function, concave in case of risk aversion. The assumption of direct
weak separability allows for two stage budgeting (see for instance Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980), Phlips (1983) or Blackorby et al. (1978)): the utility maximization problem can be
written in two steps. The first step (i.e. the second stage of the budgeting process) is
maxqA UA(qA)
s.t. ι′qA = W
for a given total financial wealth allotment W . From its solution, q?A(W ), the indirect utility
function VA(W ) = UA(q?A(W )) obtains. The second step concerns the allocation ofW between
the two assets and may be represented by the problem
maxqB,W U(VA(W ), qB)
s.t. ι′qB +W = Y
from which the optimal values q?B,W
?, q?A = qA(W
?) follow. The goal of this kind of modelling
is to focus on structural financial portfolio decisions that can be separated from other issues. It
is assumed that decisions on qA, conditional onW , can be treated independently of the decisions
on qB. A motivation for this approach is that financial assets are different from other wealth
categories which comprise mainly housing and social security wealth. Weak separability in the
preference structure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the second stage of the budgeting
process: maximizing a weakly separable utility implies that each sub–utility must be maximized
subject to the respective sub–budget; conversely, the existence of subgroup demand functions
implies weak separability (cf. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)).
In our empirical model, we explain W and, conditional upon W , we explain qA. We first
discuss the latter. According to the second step, qA is determined by W , by the after tax
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pay–offs of the riskfree and the risky asset, and by taste shifters that determine the attitude of
the household towards risk. Note that net returns on the assets vary across households, since
the tax system implies that the marginal tax rate on the returns depends on family composition
and incomes of family members. We directly allow the utility function UA to vary with the
household’s marginal tax rate. To allow for preference heterogeneity, we include several other
family characteristics. These are, together with a constant term and the marginal tax rate,
included in a vector xs. We allow for an error term εs reflecting unobserved heterogeneity. We
choose the following specification:
s = xsβs + γ logW + εs (1)
Here s is the share ofW invested in stocks and bonds. The share invested in saving accounts
is given by 1 − s and has the same form. Equation (1) corresponds to the Engel curves of the
Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)) or the translog demand system
(Christensen et al. (1975)).2 The case where W = 0 can be handled as well, since the equation
is only used for individuals with positive wealth.
The Engel curve specification given above does not yet allow for non–negativity constraints.
Such constraints — due to constraints on short sales, for instance — that lead to different regimes
in the demand equations can be included as additional optimization restrictions. Since we are
dealing with only two assets, incorporating non–negativity constraints is straightforward and
leads to corner solutions on the budget line.
The first stage concerns the choice of W . This basically depends on everything else: pay–
offs of financial assets, pay–offs and direct utility of other assets such as housing or durables,
initial wealth, current and future income, etc. We do not aim at developing a structural model
for W . Instead, we formulate two reduced form equations for W in the next section. W is
explained from a number of background variables and observed current family income. Since
unobserved heterogeneity will in general affect both the optimal share and total wealth, we allow
for correlated error terms across equations, i.e. W can be endogenous in the shares equation.
III. Econometric Model
Equation (1) determines the allocation of financial wealth W between saving accounts on the
one hand and stocks and bonds on the other hand. We thus estimate a single demand equation
for the share of stocks and bonds s. Moreover we add two equations to explain W . The wealth
equation is a reduced form equation, in which wealth is explained from income and socio–
demographic control variables. To explain the fact that those people who hold financial wealth
2In preliminary estimates we also included log2W in (1). This leads to the quadratic system of, for example,
Banks et al. (1994). The quadratic term however, was insignificant.
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(W > 0), usually hold a substantial amount, we add a threshold equation for a minimum value
of W , following Nelson (1977). The latter is included in order to increase the empirical content
of the estimated model. The threshold equation contains the same right–hand–side variables as
the wealth equation.
As already stated in the previous section, we shall work with a logarithmic transformation of
wealth: w? = logW . We write w? and not w to indicate that, in case of incomplete reporting,
this variable can be unobserved. For the same reason, the actual share of W invested in stocks
and bonds is denoted by s?. The threshold value T ?? is always unobservable. To control for
endogeneity of the level of wealth, and to take account of the fact that one or two of the amounts
invested are sometimes unobserved, we estimate the three equations jointly.
We first model latent variables w??, T ?? and s??:
w?? = xwβw + εw
T ?? = xTβT + εT
s?? = xsβs + w?γ + εs
(2)
Here w?? can be seen as a measure of desired wealth, which may be negative. s?? is the
desired fraction of stocks and bonds in wealth. It may be less than zero or larger than one. The
error terms (εw, εT , εs) are assumed to be trivariate normally distributed with mean zero and







Actual wealth may differ from desired wealth because individuals may not find it rational to
invest in the considered wealth category unless the amount is substantive:
w? = w??1[w??>T ??],
where 1[·] is an indicator which is one if the argument is true, and zero otherwise. We assume
that the probability of the threshold falling below zero is small so that the possibility that W ??
can be ignored (see the estimation results below).
The threshold equation, as well as the wealth equation, is modelled in a reduced form way.
A structural approach along the lines sketched in section II would be very complicated and
requires more information than we have in our data. Thus, the first two equations reflect both
demand and supply side factors which determine the equilibrium in the market for financial
assets. An interpretation of this threshold equation is the measurement of (unobserved) fixed
transaction costs which are imposed in a lump–sum way and influence the decision whether
or not to hold wealth in the assets under consideration. We would expect these costs, such
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as monitoring costs, to be individual specific since they might be (directly or indirectly) a
function of observables like income or family characteristics.3 4 Secondly, the thresholds may
reflect institutional restrictions such as minimum purchase requirements for stocks and bonds
or effective non–negativity constraints on saving accounts.5
The shares equation is only defined for cases in whichw?? > T ??. The actual share in stocks




0 if s?? ≤ 0
s?? if 0 < s?? < 1
1 if s?? ≥ 1
We abstract from underreporting or other forms of misreporting. Thus, if the amounts
invested in both assets are observed, total wealth W and w = w? = logW are observed. It
happens rather often however, that respondents — although they indicate to own the respective
assets — refuse to give the amount (in 354 out of 2849 cases, cf. section IV). In this case, the
only information we have is that w? > T ?? whereas the magnitudew is missing.
If both amounts are reported, we also observe the share s = s?. If one of the amounts is
positive but not reported, we observe s? if and only if the second amount is zero. In that case s? is
either zero or one. Due to non–reporting in at least one of the asset categories, s? is unobserved
for 344 out of 2658 observations.
The model used here is basically of a recursive simultaneous tobit type (cf. e.g. Maddala
(1983)). Wealth has a lower unobserved threshold value for each individual and the fraction of
stocks and bonds is bounded in the interval [0, 1]. The model does not allow for negative values
of wealth or values of the share outside the interval [0, 1]. Moreover, it allows for a positive
probability that wealth is exactly zero and for positive probabilities that the share is exactly
zero or exactly one. Conditional on being positive, wealth has a continuous distribution, and
conditional on being in the open interval (0, 1), the share follows a continuous distribution.
It should be stressed that the model is specifically tailored to the information given in the
data: the double starred variables are latent magnitudes for partly unobservables whereas the
3An indication of switching or portfolio adjustment costs is provided in the data by a variable that measures
the frequency of changes in the portfolio of stocks and bonds (excluding options): 60 % of the households holding
these assets make adjustments about once a year or even more seldom.
4Agell and Edin (1990) argue against a simple tobit specification in the shares equation if asset demand functions
conditional on ownership differ from the function for the discrete portfoliochoice: fixed transaction costs only affect
the discrete portfolio choice problem but not the conditional asset demands, since they are sunk (Mayshar (1981)).
We remedy the empirical shortcoming of this kind of modelling by allowing individual thresholds, reflecting at
least partly the presence of transaction costs, to influence the decision to hold wealth in financial assets.
5Nelson (1977, fn. 6) notes that the model would be different if all the cited possibilities for the existence
of thresholds work simultaneously but in differing directions such that a model similar to a switching regression
model would be appropriate.
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single starred symbols are in principle observable but in fact partly unobserved. Threshold
values are unobservable throughout. Ignoring the information for unobserved wealth cases —
which would be a "natural" first approach — would lead to biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates, as would ignoring households that do not hold the assets at all. The reason is that
wealth can only be unobserved if it is positive, so that observability of wealth and level of wealth
are automatically correlated. The present framework avoids these traps since it makes use of all
observations in the sample.
To complete the specification of the model, we have to add an assumption on what determines
whether a positive amount invested in one of the two asset categories will be observed. We
assume observability of asset amounts, conditional on the fact that the assets are held, to be
exogenous, i.e. the response is independent of the wealth held.6
Note that, although the model does take the problem of non–reporting appropriately into
account, we have to rely on the assumption that we do not face problems with measurement
errors (due to under–reporting for instance) with possibly non–zero expectation.
The estimation proceeds then as a full information maximum likelihood estimation which
allows to take the correlation structure between the three equations in (2) fully into account.
With wealth composed of two assets, nine regimes can be derived: each of the two assets can
be zero, positive and observed, or positive and unobserved. Each of these regimes requires its
own expression for the likelihood contribution. These likelihood contributions are noted in the
appendix. Given the distributional assumption, the estimator is consistent and asymptotically
efficient. Identification of the model is achieved by setting both covariances between εw and εT
and between εT and εs to zero and by excluding at least one variable in xw ≡ xT from xs.
IV. Data
In the analysis below we use data which provide a rich source of information on the structure of
individual wealth, which is much more detailed than other comparable data from the Netherlands.
The Dutch Collective Bank Study (Collectieve Banken Onderzoek, CBO), sampled in 1988,
consists of 3704 households with 10113 individuals in the Netherlands. The topic of the survey
is targeted at the financial structure of household and individual wealth and the institutional
6To be more precise, let us assume that observability of the two assets (j = 1, 2) is determined by the following
equations:
O?j = Xjβj + εj (j = 1, 2)
Here, O?j indicates whether the individual is prepared to answer the questions on the amount in asset j (O
?
j > 0)
or not (O?j < 0). This equation is irrelevant for people who do not hold the asset. We assume independence of the
error terms (ε1, ε2) from (εw, εT , εs). This allows to drop the observability equations in estimation, since in the
maximum likelihood procedure that we employ, the log–likelihood can be written as a sum of the log–likelihood
of these two additional equations, and the log–likelihood of the equations of interest.
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relationships of consumers to banks and financial intermediaries.
In each household the head of household (and, if present, his or her partner and children below
18), and other household members above 18 were interviewed. The questionnaire comprises
detailed information on general financial behavior, saving accounts, checking accounts and
credit cards, stocks and bonds, loans, mortgages, and insurances, as well as some background
information on the family structure, employment status, net income and socio–demographic
characteristics.
The section on savings deals with the possible types of saving accounts, amounts as well as
increments and decreases in savings, and motives for savings. In addition, there are sections on
fixed time deposits and saving certificates and certificates of deposit. A further section contains
questions on stocks and bonds, which include the wealth held in these assets and the bank
relationships.
One of the characteristic features of the data set is the detailed information on single asset
units: the amount and the institution (bank) were requested for each single account. This is a
unique feature compared with other data sets that only give crude information on asset amounts,
if at all. This leads us to believe that the information contained in the CBO data is much more
reliable and qualitatively more valuable than in other data sets. Moreover, from aggregate data
it is known, that this data set resembles, at least as far as saving accounts are concerned, the
national figures better than the SEP (Sociaal Economisch Panel). In particular, ownership rates
of saving accounts are much better represented in the CBO (Alessie et al. (1993b)). In both
CBO and SEP however, there seems to be considerable underreporting on the amounts.
The survey was carried out by Research International Nederland (RIN). Within each asset
category ownership questions had to be answered and, conditional on this being positive, the
amount was requested. In the questions regarding the ownership we have virtually no missing
values as opposed to the variables regarding the amounts.
Since this paper deals with the structure of wealth on household level, the individual respons-
es had to be aggregated to household level. This resulted in 3704 household observations. We
thus assess the financial situation of the entire household, which is assumed to form one single
decision unit. Amounts for specific assets have been summed over all assets in the asset category
and over all household members. It has been assumed that the household characteristics for
non–wealth related variables can be replaced by the respective characteristics of the head of
the household. In terms of the definition of the head of the household we largely follow the
conventions of the SEP.7
7The SEP defines the head of the household as the husband of a married couple or the parent for single parent
households or — apart from few exceptions — the person that is considered to be head by other household members.
The self–reported indicator for the position within the household was not considered as identifier for the head of
the household. By the assignment used here it is ensured that each and every household has one and only one head.
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In the estimated model 501 observations dropped out due to missing values in the explanatory
variable on net income, an additional 32 observations were discarded as severe outliers in
this respect, leaving 3171 observations. However, comparing statistics of these data with the
respective statistics from the full sample shows, that the distribution of the observations used
resembles the full sample distribution for all variables quite neatly. This suggests that selection
bias due to unobserved income is not a serious problem. The distribution of financial wealth is
dominated by saving accounts (cf. table 1). The savings variable comprises the amounts held in
saving account balances, time deposit accounts and saving certificates and certificates of deposit.
84% of all households report to have positive amounts of savings, whereas only 200 households
(6.3%) hold stocks and bonds. The latter variable is the sum of shares in domestic companies,
shares in foreign companies, shares in investment fonds, options, bonds and mortgage bonds.
Only 191 (6%) of the observed households hold both asset categories. 39 households holding
stocks and bonds refused to give the value of their stocks and bonds, 315 households with
positive savings did not report the amount. These include 10 households that reported neither
of the two amounts, although having answered both ownership questions in the affirmative.
Summary statistics of explanatory and dependent variables are presented in table 2. The
distribution of stocks and bonds is highly skewed with a skewness8 parameter of 16.3. The
mean of all reported stocks and bonds is about 3800 Dfl., the mean of the positive observations
is about 73,000 Dfl. For savings the picture is less dramatic: the mean of all observed saving
accounts balances is around 13,000 Dfl., while the conditional mean of positive observations is
about 16,000 Dfl. The skewness amounts to 10.6. 18.1% of the wealth observations are strictly
positive, the mean and median for financial wealth, conditional on being positive, are about
20,000 and 4,700 Dfl., respectively.
Due to non–reporting, direct information on total wealth invested in the two assets is available
in only 2827 cases. Looking at ln(wealth + 1), a variable which is closely related to the one used
in the empirical analysis (ln(wealth)), except that it includes the cases where wealth is zero, has
a mean of 6.8, whereas its median is 8.0. The income variable (ln(income + 1)) used in the
analysis has mean and median both equal to 7.74. The skewness parameters of ln(wealth+1) and
ln(income+1) are negative: -0.92 and -2.61 respectively, whereas wealth and income themselves
are skewed to the right (skewness parameters 11.5 and 19.1, respectively).
Turning to the background variables, from table 2 it can be seen that 59.8% of the heads of
the households were full–time employed, and only 4.9% part–time. This is partly due to the fact
that only 20.2% of the households were headed by women. Four dummies on the occupational
status of the head of the household are used (farmer, self–employed or manager, white–collar,
blue–collar), covering 79.7% of all households. The remaining 20.3% are mainly nonworkers.
Looking at the geographical distribution, 19.6% of all households were living in the southern
8as defined by skewness(x) ≡ E(x− E(x))3/σ3, where σ2 is the variance of x.
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provinces (Noord–Brabant and Limburg), whereas 34.1% lived in five northern regions. The
reference category includes the provinces in the highly populated west of the country. The other
variables in table 2 are self–explanatory.
To get some rough ideas about the extent to which Dutch households diversify their portfolios,
tables 3 and 4 provide information on the total level of diversification in the data. The assets
in the data set can be aggregated to 4 broader asset categories as: saving accounts and related
assets, stocks and bonds, housing wealth and life insurance contracts. The figures show that
30% of all households in the sample hold only one asset, 34% hold two, 25% three, and only
3% of the households hold a "fully" diversified portfolio. The mean number of asset categories
is around 1.83 whereas the median is 2, the standard deviation amounts to 0.99. From table 3 it
can be seen that no households exclusively hold stocks and bonds. Out of the 200 households
who do hold stocks and bonds, 106 also have a life insurance. Moreover, of those holding
stocks and bonds, 80% own a house. The picture is a bit different for families possessing saving
accounts: 47% of these households have a life insurance policy, and 53% own a house. The
data reveal a substantial correlation between house and life insurance ownership. 56% of house
owners have a life insurance policy, 61% of life insurance bearers own their house. Two things
are worth mentioning: First, there is considerable lack of diversification within the groups, i.e.
most households hold only very few assets within each category. Second, even the full range of
assets covered by the questionnaire is not a complete compilation of all assets in the market.
Finally, the survey provides information on other wealth–related magnitudes such as mort-
gages and loans, durable goods, insurance contracts and checking accounts. These categories
have not been considered here. Checking accounts are usually viewed as a temporary storage for
incoming resources and source for daily expenditures, and thus are more a reflection of the flow
of income and saving rather than a stock of a particular wealth category. Moreover, virtually
every household (99%) in the sample does hold checking accounts. Insurance contracts do only
indirectly contribute to wealth, durables are to a large extent consumption goods, and mortgages
and loans do contribute to the net but not to the gross wealth position of the household.
V. Results
The estimation results are presented in table 5. The parameters give the change in the expected
value of the dependent variables, i.e. w??, T ?? or s??, in response to a change in the exogenous
variables. The left hand panel of the table contains the estimates for the wealth equation, i.e. the
total amount invested in the two assets. From this it can be seen that (net) income has a strong
and significant effect on the level of wealth. The income elasticity of wealth is 0.47. Evaluating
the estimated equation at sample means reveals log income to be the major determinant of
wealth.
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The marginal tax rate on income is found to be highly significant and shows a considerable
tax responsiveness of households to hold savings and stocks and bonds.9 10
Age has a strong positive and significant effect on wealth. A squared age term has been
included in order to capture non–linearities, although the first order term is insignificant. The
estimated age function is increasing throughout for the sample observations. It should be noted
that pure age effects cannot be disentangled from cohort effects in this cross–section study (for
attempts in this direction: see King and Dicks–Mireaux (1982)). On average, full–time workers
hold higher wealth than the reference group (which comprises employees who work only few
hours, disabled persons and unemployed, retirees, students and housewives), which in itself is
not surprising.
The level of education is controlled for by inclusion of a dummy variable for high education,
which is negative but insignificant, and an interaction term for high education and age, which is
positive and significant at the 5% level. Together these estimates suggest that wealth increases
with educational level for all but the youngest age groups.
The parameter estimate for blue– and white–collar workers (although insignificant for the
latter group) indicate a lower engagement in the considered asset groups, compared to the
reference group (people without paid job and others). An explanation could be that these
persons hold more wealth in other assets which are not included here.
In order to control for possibly different saving behavior of farmers, a dummy variable for
this profession has been included and the estimate turns out to be significant, whereas other
selfemployed persons or employees in a managerial position do not hold significant amounts in
the assets under consideration. It should be noted however, that the questionnaire usually does
not distinguish between private and business assets of the self–employed and farmers. In this
respect, one would expect a positive effect of being self–employed if shares in own businesses
are included in the amount given. Moreover, the decision of being a farmer and the decision of
how much wealth to hold may be interrelated.
Family composition appears to be an important determinant of wealth holding: married
or unmarried couples and parents with children hold significantly more wealth than single
individuals. Savings for future children or for children that have already left the household,
could explain why couples without and couples with children behave similarly. Finally, there
is a geographical effect: households from northern regions hold more wealth on average than
households from the west. An explanation might be that housing prices in the northern areas
are lower than in other regions. If investment in housing is inelastic, this might increase the
9on 5% significance level; this is the level chosen throughout
10According to Agell and Edin (1990), the marginal tax rate might be endogenous since it applies to income out
of wealth as well. Since we have constructed the marginal tax rate on basis of measured net monthly income, which
probably excludes asset income, this problem might be less severe here. Due to lack of appropriate instruments,
we could not test for endogeneity explicitly.
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allocation of wealth in savings and stocks and bonds. Further investigations should include
housing wealth and clarify this conjecture.
The second panel of the table displays the parameter estimates of the threshold equation.
Many of the parameter estimates are significant, including σT . This indicates that adding the
threshold equation is an improvement compared to the model in which T ?? ≡ 0. This is also
indicated by a likelihood ratio test. The results indicate that the threshold for holding financial
assets increases with net income but decreases with the marginal tax rate. Together with the
corresponding estimate from the wealth equation, the former effect indicates that the higher
one’s income, the higher is the threshold for investing in financial assets, and given that this
threshold is being passed, the higher is the amount invested there. The effect of the tax rate can
be caused by preferential taxation especially of stocks and bonds which induces to hold more
of them, such that with a rising marginal tax rate the gap between the threshold and the amount
of wealth held widens in both directions. We only partly capture arbitraging possibilities which
are due to the structure of the Dutch tax system: Interest on savings is tax free up to a level
of 1000 Dfl. for singles (and 2000 Dfl. for couples). Beyond that, there is an additional tax
allowance of 1000 (2000) Dfl. for dividend income. Thus, including just one threshold does not
give full justice to the incentive scheme provided by the tax system. We do, however, control
for an influence of the marginal tax rate on the demand for risky assets (see below).
Age has a similar effect on the threshold as it has on wealth, although much more pronounced.
The point estimates indicate the threshold function conditional on age to lie below the wealth
function for the entire sample. Educational and occupational effects on thresholds could not be
detected, by and large. The exceptions are selfemployed individuals who face a higher threshold
value. For couples, households with children or those headed by women, the thresholds are found
to be lower than for the reference group (single, widowed, divorced, childless). Apparently,
these groups are more willing to hold small amounts of financial assets than others. It might
reflect that their (subjective) time and money costs are lower. In addition, northern households
have significantly lower thresholds than households from the west.
Turning to the third equation, the presumption that the wealthier households hold relatively
more risky assets is confirmed by the parameter of the wealth variable log(wealth). Wealth is
the most important determinant of the share of stocks and bonds. In terms of consumer demand
theory this means that stocks and bonds are a luxury: if financial wealth increases by 1%,
the amount invested in stocks and bonds increases by more than 1%. If we rewrite the utility
function in terms of returns, it implies that relative risk aversion decreases with wealth: if W
increases, the share invested in the risky asset also increases (cf. Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964)).
The marginal tax rate influences the decision of how to allocate wealth between different
assets and induces people to choose more risky assets. This is in line with the predictions from
the rather simplistic Domar/Musgrave model on the effects of a proportional income tax with full
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loss offset, since there the marginal rate of transformation between risk and return of the assets
is unaffected and the remaining negative pure wealth effect can only be compensated by taking
higher risk. In general however, the theoretical predictions of the effects of taxation on portfolio
choice depend on the parameters of the underlying utility function and the distribution of asset
returns (Feldstein (1976)) as well as on other features of the tax system, e.g. deductibility of fixed
transaction costs (Leape (1987)). Moreover, deductibility of interest payments and exempts in
the Dutch tax system, as sketched above, gives rise to the diversification pattern for households
with high marginal tax rates observed in these estimates.
The educational level plays a significant role as well. Higher educated people tend to hold
more stocks and bonds relative to savings. One might interpret this in favor of the hypothesis of
King and Leape (1984, 1987) that asset holdings are determined by the informational status that
the investor has acquired with respect to certain assets. Since stocks and bonds can be viewed
as information intensive assets and the informational status can be proxied by the educational
level of the investor, one could interpret the finding here as supportive of this hypothesis. But —
abstracting from cohort effects — there should be an influence of age as well. The quadratic age
specification exhibits a strongly significant u–shaped pattern for the relative demand of stocks
and bonds, with a minimum at age 46.
Viewing this in the light of liquidity constraints, the result obtained here is somewhat counter–
intuitive, since it has been argued that younger people refrain from holding riskier assets due to
tighter borrowing restrictions (cf. Paxson (1990) for this effect, if riskier assets are less liquid).
If younger workers have a higher labor supply flexibility however, this might insure them against
income risk and enable them to hold more risky assets (see Bodie et al. (1992)).
The occupational and professional variables could be interpreted as proxies for income risk,
but since they are insignificant we cannot detect such an effect. It should be pointed out, however,
that it is quite likely that the occupational or professional choice is subject to a self–selection
effect where less risk averse people choose riskier jobs and thus these dummies do not measure
the effect of pure income risk (cf. Guiso et al. (1994)).
The estimate for the covariance between the first and third equation in (2) is insignificant
however and the correlation coefficient ofρws = 0.099 does not indicate a pronounced correlation
between the level of wealth and the share in risky assets.
In order to assess the fit of the model, we predict the number of observations, the level
of the threshold values and the level of the log of wealth for each regime. Four regimes are
distinguished, according to whether the amounts invested in stocks and bonds and in saving
accounts are positive or zero. For this purpose, we have carried out a simulation from the
estimated parameter values. The results are shown in table 6. Comparing the estimated
figures with those found in the data shows that the model in its present specification does quite
well. Overall, we on average correctly capture 98.9% of the observations in four distinguishable
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regimes.11 Only the regimes with positive stocks and bonds but zero savings cannot be recovered
accurately, which is due to the small number of observations in this regime in the data. The value
of the thresholds below which no wealth in the considered assets is held varies across regimes
and is on average substantially higher in the first regime than in the other three. In general, there
is not much that can be expected a–priori about the threshold values. By and large, they seem to
be of reasonable order. Interestingly, the thresholds are lowest for the case where no stocks and
bonds but exclusively saving accounts are held, indicating lower hurdles for the demand for the
"riskier" asset.
Since σT is small compared to the systematic part ofT ??, the probability of a negativeT ?? will
become small. Thus, we can safely ignore the possibility that T ?? < W ?? < 0 (cf. section II).
This is also indicated by the comparison of conditional means to conditional standard deviations
per regime, as displayed in table 6.
VI. Conclusions
This paper deals with the question of how people in the Netherlands structure their portfolios in
financial wealth. We focus on two major asset categories, namely savings and stocks and bonds,
and estimate demand equations in the form of budget shares by an extended tobit model. One
of the main determinants of asset demand, namely the overall amount invested in the two asset
groups, is taken to be endogenous, and thus the econometric specification explains wealth and
the share in risky assets simultaneously.
Compared with other studies in this field, the first innovation provided here is that the
econometric model takes non–reporting of endogenous variables fully into account. The usual
approach would be to discard all missing values in endogenous variables without exploiting their
informational content (Feldstein (1976) even ignores zero–wealth observations). Second, the
introduction of a threshold equation improves the fit dramatically In a previous version of this
paper we presented the analysis with a deterministic zero threshold for wealth, and discarded
for comparison the incomplete observations (about ten percent of the sample). Results, which
are available from the authors on request, show that this theoretically incorrect treatment leads
to less precise and biased estimates in the shares equation and renders a rather poor fit of the
model.
Nevertheless, the model estimated here still has some drawbacks. One is that the specification
does not allow for heteroscedastic error terms. This might be overcome by allowing the errors
to be a function of wealth, for instance, or by a transformation of the endogenous variable in the
shares equation (e.g. as in Ioannides (1992) or Hubbard (1985)). Furthermore, some additional
11In the simulations we do not consider the observability problem for positive but non–reported amounts which
gives rise to additional 5 regimes (cf. table 1).
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scrutiny of the exclusion restrictions in the shares equation might be in order. And in terms of
exogenous variables, human capital might play a role in the portfolio choice decision (this is
stressed by e.g. Feldstein (1976) or Bodie et al. (1992)). The assumption of trivariate normality
can be considered as a further drawback. Semi–parametric estimators for the model at hand,
taking account of the unobservability problem, are not yet available, however.
One extension certainly concerns the number of assets chosen. It would be worthwhile to
include housing wealth into the portfolio model since the value of the house is the single most
important asset in the data. However, the modelling would have to take account of mortgages.
From the econometric point of view this would add more regimes to the likelihood and make
estimation more cumbersome (we have up to 3n regimes if n denotes the number of assets.) In
this case one would have to consider more closely the non–negativity constraints that in the two
asset case can be captured by the tobit specification. This also might lead to different estimation
methods (cf. Wales and Woodland (1983)). More structure could be achieved if fixed cost would
explicitly be taken into account.
From the theoretical part, it might be worthwhile to leave the framework of the static
neoclassical consumer demand model and to look at dynamic models which explain life cycle
behavior where agents maximize a discounted expected utility subject to life cycle budget
constraints.
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Appendix
This appendix lists the regimes and likelihood contribution for the model (2):
w?? = xwβw + εw
T ?? = xTβT + εT
s?? = xsβs + w
?γ + εs
non–negativity constraints:
w? = w??1[w??>T ??]
s? =

0 if s?? ≤ 0
s?? if 0 < s?? < 1
1 if s?? ≥ 1
Assuming normality with
Σ =
 σ2w ρwTσwσT ρwsσwσs· σ2T ρTsσTσs
· · σ2s

plus the restrictions ρTs = ρwT = 0 (i.e. independence under normality).
In the followingW denotes total wealth and w = logW . For the reduced form contributions (regimes 3,















Univariate pdf, cdf and bivariate cdf of the standard normal are denoted by φ(·),Φ(·), Φbv(·, ·, ·),
respectively.
Likelihood contributionsL (regimes coded as in table 1):
1. W > 0:





2. W > 0, observed, s = 0:











Pr(s?? ≤ 0, T ?? < w|w?? = w) =
= Φ
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3. W > 0, unobserved, s = 0:
L = Pr(s?? ≤ 0, w?? > T ??) =










Since w? is unobserved in this case, and w?? = w?, the reduced form has to be exploited.
4. W > 0, observed, s = 1 (analogous to regime 2):






















5. W > 0, unobserved, s = 1 (analogous to regime 3):
L = Pr(s?? ≥ 1, w?? > T ??) = Φbv
(







6. W > 0, 0 < s < 1, both observed:
L = fs??,w??(s, w) · Pr(T

























7. Let a1 denote the amount of stocks and bonds held;





??) Pr(T ?? > w??|a1, s
??)ds??
with







f(·, ·) is the density of (a?1, s
??) = (s?? exp(w??), s??), obtained from the bivariate normal density
of (w??, s??) and including a Jacobian. Numerical integration is required.
8. Let a2 denote the amount of savings held;





??) Pr(T ?? > w??|a2, s
??)ds??
with








9. W > 0, 0 < s < 1, both stocks and bonds and savings are unobserved:





















Table 1: number of observations per regime
number of savings = 0 savings> 0 savings> 0 sum
observations (%) (observed) (unobserved)
stocks & bonds = 0 regime 1 regime 2 regime 3
513 (16.18) 2192 (69.13) 266 (8.39) 2971 (93.69)
stocks & bonds > 0 regime 4 regime 6 regime 7
(observed) 8 (0.25) 114 (3.59) 39 (1.23) 161 (5.08)
stocks & bonds > 0 regime 5 regime 8 regime 9
(unobserved) 1 (0.03) 28 (0.88) 10 (0.32) 39 (1.23)
sum 522 (16.46) 2334 (73.60) 315 (9.93) 3171 (100.00)
Table 2: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
stocks & bonds 3132 3765.3 39776 0 974000
savings 2856 13341 50493 0 983095
wealth 2827 16512 69984 0 1415249
fraction of
stocks & bonds 2314 0.0273 0.1367 0 1
log(income+1) 3171 7.7361 0.7639 0 12.92
income 3171 3535.2 14062 0 410000
marginal tax rate 3171 0.4837 0.0720 0 0.7
age of head 3171 44.004 15.422 18 89
age squared / 1000 3171 2.1741 1.5165 0.324 7.921
high education 3171 0.1583 0.3651 0 1
high education * age 3171 6.4566 15.667 0 77
full-time work 3171 0.5976 0.4905 0 1
part-time work 3171 0.0489 0.2157 0 1
farmer 3171 0.0076 0.0867 0 1
selfemployed 3171 0.0952 0.2936 0 1
whitecollar 3171 0.4447 0.4970 0 1
bluecollar 3171 0.2491 0.4326 0 1
married or
living together 3171 0.6976 0.4594 0 1
female 3171 0.2021 0.4017 0 1
children 3171 0.979 1.1221 0 8
small children 3171 0.2983 0.6545 0 4
region: north 3171 0.3409 0.4741 0 1
region: south 3171 0.1962 0.3971 0 1
Definition of variables:
savings: sum of the amounts held in saving account balances, time deposit accounts and saving cer-
tificates and certificates of deposit.
22
stocks and bonds: shares in domestic companies, shares in foreign companies, shares in invest-
ment fonds, options, bonds and mortgage bonds.
wealth: sum of savings and stocks and bonds
fraction of stocks and bonds: is the share of this asset category in wealth
income: the sum of monthly net income (in Dfl) of the head of the household and his or her partner.
7 households report zero income. The income sources are not specified. Since it is monthly, income
probably excludes asset income.
marginal tax rate: calculated from individual net income based on the parameters of the Dutch
tax system in 1988; the household tax rate is chosen to equal the maximum of the individual tax rates
within the household.
Age: measured in years.
The other explanatory variables are dummy variables (except for the number of children and small
children). The educational status is captured by the variable on high education (university degree or
higher vocational school), the reference group includes everything else.
Labor supply is captured by the indicators forfull-time (36 hours per week or more) andpart-time
employment (10 – 35 hours), the reference group consists of people who work less or not at all (disabled,
unemployed, retired, students and housewives/men without alternative occupation).
Professional status is described by the variables farmer (farmer or market gardener), selfem-
ployed (includes free lancers, managers or owners of firms), whitecollar employees, and
bluecollar workers. Reference group here are people without paid employment and others.
The variable small children gives the number of children of age 6 and below.
The remaining variables on family composition and marital status are self–explaining. Regional dummy
variables distinguish between north (provinces Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland)
and south (Noord Brabant and Limburg) of the country (reference group: Noord and Zuid Holland,
Utrecht, Zeeland, Flevoland).
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Table 3: structure of diversification in 4 major asset categories
stocks saving life housing Obs. Percent
& bonds accounts insurance wealth
1 yes yes yes yes 89 2.81
2 yes yes yes no 12 0.38
3 yes yes no yes 65 2.05
4 yes yes no no 25 0.79
5 yes no yes yes 1 0.03
6 yes no yes no 4 0.13
7 yes no no yes 4 0.13
8 yes no no no 0 0.00
9 no yes yes yes 710 22.39
10 no yes yes no 436 13.75
11 no yes no yes 544 17.16
12 no yes no no 768 24.22
13 no no yes yes 65 2.05
14 no no yes no 101 3.19
15 no no no yes 72 2.27
16 no no no no 275 8.67
total 3171 100.00
Table 4: level of diversification in 4 major asset categories
number of Obs. Percent Cumulative
asset categories
0 275 8.67 8.67
1 941 29.68 38.35
2 1078 34.00 72.34
3 788 24.85 97.19
4 89 2.81 100.00
Total 3171 100.00
Table 5: Estimation results
dependent variable: log of wealth w?? threshold T ?? fraction of stocks and bonds s??
Variable estimate stddev. t-value estimate stddev. t-value estimate stddev. t-value
constant 1.953 0.493 3.958 3.601 0.763 4.718 -4.097 0.651 -6.294
log(income+1) 0.471 0.053 8.962 0.536 0.099 5.421
marginal tax rate 2.064 0.790 2.612 -3.060 1.398 -2.188 2.538 0.810 3.133
age of head -0.007 0.020 -0.340 -0.047 0.027 -1.725 -0.036 0.017 -2.150
age squared / 1000 0.445 0.208 2.145 0.877 0.281 3.122 0.391 0.183 2.132
high education -0.639 0.369 -1.730 -0.062 0.597 -0.103 0.350 0.093 3.782
age * high education 0.023 0.009 2.603 0.006 0.015 0.396
full-time work 0.723 0.131 5.504 0.182 0.198 0.923 0.063 0.175 0.358
part-time work 0.140 0.197 0.713 -0.170 0.289 -0.588 0.146 0.203 0.716
farmer 1.197 0.496 2.411 -0.746 1.142 -0.653
selfemployed 0.048 0.196 0.243 1.017 0.296 3.437 0.135 0.171 0.794
white-collar -0.182 0.138 -1.322 -0.274 0.199 -1.373 0.155 0.145 1.071
blue-collar -0.537 0.145 -3.691 0.193 0.198 0.973 -0.267 0.184 -1.448
married or lvng. tog. 0.368 0.141 2.605 -0.678 0.196 -3.464
female -0.251 0.144 -1.741 -0.707 0.200 -3.536
number of children 0.010 0.051 0.199 -0.273 0.079 -3.440
small children -0.094 0.077 -1.217 -0.188 0.135 -1.390
region: north 0.184 0.090 2.053 -0.350 0.134 -2.613
region: south 0.196 0.115 1.695 -0.114 0.172 -0.660 -0.155 0.103 -1.514
log(wealth) 0.240 0.094 2.560
covariance matrix of error terms
stddev wealth 2.008 0.045 44.667
stddev thresh. 1.352 0.044 30.394
stddev shares 0.795 0.069 11.575
corr. wealth/thresh. 0.0 fixed
corr. wealth/shares 0.099 0.219 0.452
corr. shares/thresh. 0.0 fixed
Log-likelihood: -26520.1502
number of obs.: 3171
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Table 6: model performancea
number of log wealth simulated
observations (held) threshold values
data simul. data simul. mean stddev.
stocks & bonds = 0
savings = 0 513 501 0.00 0.00 6.59 1.50
stocks & bonds = 0
savings> 0 2458 2456 8.16 8.15 4.90 1.55
stocks & bonds > 0
savings = 0 9 27 10.69 11.74 5.63 1.74
stocks & bonds > 0
savings> 0 191 187 10.41 10.46 5.36 1.71
athe actual values are for regimes 1, 2, 4, and 6, the predicted values include information from regimes 1, 2 &
3, 4 & 5, and 6 – 9, respectively; the expected values for log wealth and the thresholds have been calculated by
simulation, based on 50 random draws
